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Abstract
We investigate various group-size distributions occurring in a situation where each group’s
resource is exposed to appropriation by other groups. The amount of appropriation depends
on the size difference between groups. Our work focuses on the cases where the entire
community isolates a small group or even an individual to maximize its gain. While people’s
basic motivation to form a group can be understood based on the group-size effect on multi-
plying a collective asset, sensitive factors that induce a asymmetric group distribution are
the group efficiency and the ratio of secured assets to assets pending in a competition. We
show that social rejection to a minor group may occur when the group efficiency is relatively
low and their asset is severely exposed to possible appropriation.
Introduction
Minority denotes ostracized individuals or groups that are inferior to the rest of the population
in terms of their power, numeric size, group features, group conditions and treatment [1, 2].
Discrimination and hostility against certain groups of people has been common practice,
observed across different societies [3–5].
There are two types of Economic models of discrimination: competitive models and collec-
tive models [4]. While most of economic analysis is based on competitive model and has
focused on individual behavior inducing discrimination [6–8], there has been relatively few
work on collective models dealing with collective group interactions.
In the context of the game theory, social exclusion and segregation has been mainly dealt as
an effective control of defectors [9–12]. While the most approaches have treated peer rejection
as an effective mean of punishment for free-riders, there have been not many studies in the
context of group formation process. In [13], the author used a stochastic group-forming
model to describe passive rejection and showed that people’s thrust of belongingness and
homophily can create an accidental outcast.
In this paper, we investigate isolation of minorities and active social rejection to an individ-
ual occurring in group formation in game theoretical framework. That is, we first define the
payoffs for each individuals, given every perceivable group (coalition) structures, and then
check if each group structure is stable or not, as in the conventional game-theoretic analysis on
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group formation [14–19]. We analyse effects of the relative group size on conflicts and appro-
priations between groups. The emerging literature on political economics on tradeoff between
production and appropriation has shown that conflict in economic interactions imposes pro-
found implications for the distribution of resources [20–23]. Especially in [24], the influence
of distributional conflict in a “winner-take-all” contest on alliance formation has been studied.
We study how group of various size forms if each group’s resource is partially exposed to
appropriation. In the presence of conflicts, people need to decide their group size compromis-
ing between performance, appropriation, and security. One of our main concern is to develop
a minimal model that explains the ubiquity of the minority isolation. As such, we focus on
how the relative size of groups affects on group productions and conflicts, while assuming that
all the members in groups equally share their product and loss.
Model
Benefit of forming groups
One of the main benefits of forming a group is to multiply a collective output by making better
use of members’ skills and resources through cooperation. We assume the output of a group
of n persons is
c na
where c> 0 is a proportional constant. We call an exponent α 0 the group efficiency, which
represents the degree of effectiveness of the group size in output. For α = 1, the performance of
the group is simply proportional to its size. As such, the group size essentially has the null effect
on the group production. If α> 1, nα exhibits increasing returns to scale and the size of each
group has a greater effect on its share than for α = 1. This gives an motivation to organize as a
large group as possible, since the members mean share increase accordingly. On the contrary,
the managing cost for large groups can grow faster than the group size, for example, due to
bureaucratic inefficiency. If 0 α< 1, forming a group is not an attractive choice to people
as their mean share reduces with the group size, unless there is further motivation. From here
on, we assume that the proportional coefficient c is one for convenience. We additionally
assume that there is a group income tax paid for the central maintenance and service. A group
of n persons pays the tax
rT na
which is proportional to the group output nα with the tax rate rT, 0 rT 1. The tax in the
model represents a fixed-rate expenditure proportional to an absolute group size.
Conflict-induced wealth redistribution
Wealth redistribution between groups, which is induced by group-group conflicts, contrasts
with the tax and depends on a relative group size. Suppose N people forms K exclusive groups,
n1, n2,   , nK with ∑k = 1 nk = N 3. We consider a situation where groups directly confronts
one another and a part of their group products, rC nai ; 0  rC  1 are exposed to mutual appro-
priation. That is, here rC represents the ratio of the assets subject to appropriation, reflecting
intensity of conflicts.
We assume that, in conflicts, a group’s gain(loss) against another group depends on their
size difference. To be more specific, suppose that group i and group j confront each other and
group i is larger than group j. We assume that group i deprives group j of its exposed asset
rC naj in proportion of their relative size difference (ni − nj)/N. Hence the amount of asset that
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group i takes away from group j is
rC
ni   nj
N
naj :
The total asset of group i is now obtained by summing up the above values: the original prod-
uct nai minus the income tax rT n
a
i , the gain from the small groups rCðni   nkÞn
a
k=N; ni > nk,
and the loss to the larger groups rCðnk   niÞnai =N; nk > ni. This can be formulated as
gi ¼ nai   rT n
a
i þ
rC
N
XK
k¼1; ni>nk
ðni   nkÞn
a
k  
rC
N
XK
k¼1; ni<nk
ðnk   niÞn
a
i ð1Þ
¼ ð1   rTÞnai þ
rC
N
XK
k¼1
ðni   nkÞminfn
a
i ; n
a
kg: ð2Þ
Note that the amounts of the tax and the appropriation do not directly affect each other. While
the amount of the tax is determined from the absolute size of the group, what determines the
appropriation is the relative size of the group.
Now we define the individual payoff of a member in group i as πi = gi/ni, assuming that the
wealth in the group is equally shared. That is,
pi ¼
gi
ni
ð3Þ
¼ ð1   rTÞna  1i þ
rC
N
XK
k¼1
ðni   nkÞmin
(
na  1i ;
nak
ni
)
ð4Þ
Note that introducing group conflicts and appropriation may twist the group size effect. For
example, we confirmed above that no group spontaneously forms with the small group-size
effect, 0 α< 1. This is no more true with conflicts existing, since their smallness makes
groups more vulnerable to appropriation. Even when forming a group does not promote effi-
cient productions in output, people can make an alliance to protect their assets.
If rC is low, conflicts between groups are not severe, and a relatively large part of the group
production can be secured for each group. On the contrary, a high value of rC indicates that
the society is driven by intensive conflicts and the large portion of the assets is subject to
appropriation by other groups. Especially when rC > 1 − rT, the society is driven by intensive
conflicts and the situation becomes very harsh to minor groups. Most of their properties is at
risk of being taken by larger groups. What is even worse is that they have to pay out the fixed-
rate tax, regardless of how much they lost in the conflicts. This implies that some small groups
unavoidably end up with a negative payoff.
Group dynamics
People change or create their groups to increase their individual payoff. We assume that an
individual can deviate from one group and get in another, only with the consent of the people
in the group that he/she wants to join. This implies that transfer can occur only when it leads
to increase in payoffs of both the new comer and existing members. In addition, an individual
can escape from a group and create a singleton, if staying alone is more beneficial than remain-
ing in the group. Group dynamics is a serial combination of such individual movements. We
are interested in searching Nash equilibriums of group distributions where no individual has
incentive to change their groups any more.
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Result
The group distribution at Nash equilibrium varies widely with respect to the group efficiency
α and the conflict intensity rC. We divide the cases below into low/high conflict society with
low/neutral/high group efficiency.
Society with neutral group efficiency (α = 1)
In case that the group product linearly increases with the group size, all possible group distri-
butions are equally attractive and people are indifferent in changing their groups. However,
the presence of group conflicts and central taxation makes the situation more complicated.
People further have to consider possible appropriation between them when forming groups.
As a result, there are two groups left in the end, of which size ratio may vary.
Theorem 1 Suppose α = 1. Let n0 be the size of the largest group in the initial group distribu-
tion. Then the group distribution converges to a two-group formation, (n, N − n), where
n ¼ maxfn0; d
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
N2=2þ 1=4
p
  1=2eg.
Here dxe denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. According to Theorem 1,
distributions with more than three groups are unstable and bound to merge into a two-group
formation. The size of the larger group is
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
N2=2þ 1=4
p
  1=2Þ  0:7N or greater. Once
there appears a group larger than 70% of the population, the members have no incentive to
accept a new comer. That is, unless the initial group formation includes a larger group from
the beginning, the distribution ends up with the 70:30 formation. It is notable that the asym-
metric size ratio depends only on the initial condition n0, not on either rT or rC, although the
result cannot be achieved without the presence of group conflicts and central taxation,
Society with high group efficiency (α> 1)
The desire to unify grows with the group efficiency. For an intermediate value of α> 1, people
tend to create a large group to maximize the group output. This motivation competes with a
tendency to leave out small groups outside so that they can appropriate the small group’s pro-
duction. However, with high values of α, the benefit of unifying groups overwhelms the poten-
tial appropriation.
Theorem 2 For sufficiently large α> 1, the only Nash equilibrium is single grand group
distribution.
Low conflict society with low group efficiency (α< 1, rC 1 − rT)
When the group efficiency is less than 1, α< 1, the situation becomes more complex. Although
people basically want to stand alone due to low group efficiency, still in the presence of con-
flicts, they further have to seek security against appropriation. This motivation leads to two
completely different situations, depending the intensity of conflict rC.
If conflicts between group are rather weak, multiple groups commonly appear. As α
decreases below 1, two-group formations in Theorem 1 are bound to break, making more vari-
ous group formations possible. For example, if N = 100, rT = rC = 4/9 and α = 4/5, the group
distributions such as (83, 17), (74, 20, 6), (63, 29, 7, 1) are all possible Nash equilibriums. Still,
in this regime of mild competition, rC 1 − rT, an extremely low group efficiency makes peo-
ple scatter, giving up grouping:
Theorem 3 Suppose rC 1 − rT. For sufficiently small α< 1, the groups break into all
singletons.
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Conflict-driven society with low group efficiency (α< 1, rC > 1 − rT)
When α is small, the group formation depends on rC and drastically changes across the value
rC = 1 − rT. If rC > 1 − rT, appropriation of other groups becomes a dominant part of the
group members’ gain. In the appropriation, since the group efficiency is low, more significant
factor is how much bigger their group is than their opponents. They concern the size differ-
ence, rather than opponent’s absolute size and the corresponding output. That is, the
situation becomes close to a pure power game. The group distribution ends up with an asym-
metric formation that consists of one large group and several minor groups. For example,
(80, 2, 2, 1, . . .1) is one typical equilibrium.
As α decreases, the size gap gets widened. Especially in the limit of α! 0, with a little strong
condition as rC > NN  2 ð1   rTÞ, all small groups are eventually merging to the largest group,
leaving one unfortunate individual as an outcast.
Theorem 4 Suppose rC > 1 − rT. For sufficiently small α< 1, there is at most one group of
which size is greater than 1. Moreover, suppose the initial distribution is not the single grand
group and suppose a slightly stronger condition rT > 1   N  2N rC holds. Then the only Nash equi-
librium is (N − 1, 1).
This indicates occurrence of the social rejection, like (99, 1). The absolute portion of the
profits that the members of the larger group share is from exploitation of the isolated individ-
ual. Theorem 4 implies that people form a large group and isolate an outcast when they find
no intrinsic benefits in forming a group.
When a large portion of their asset is exposed to severe competition, people start to use the
exclusion and isolation strategy. They aggregate not because they can produce more, but
because they can deprive more. The model indeed reveals a subtle point regarding social exclu-
sion: in a predatory economy, a welfare gap between being a part of a larger group and being
an isolated individual becomes extremely large. One is made to cooperate to exclude someone
else, in fear of others victimizing him or her first.
Discussion
In this study, we investigate the group formation in the situation where the assets of the group
are subject to appropriation in conflicts. It is assumed that the absolute size of each group
determines the first-hand group production and the relative size determines the second-hand
redistribution. We are especially interested in finding conditions for extremely asymmetric
group distributions, and it turns out that isolation of minority occurs if the group efficiency is
low and the portion of the assets at risk of loss is high in conflicts. It is an irony that people
form an exclusive group and create a minority, when there is no intrinsic benefits of forming a
group like promoting productivity through internal collaboration. They do such things
because rejection and appropriation is a better way to raise their benefits. This explains why
social ostracism more frequently occurs in educational, political or cultural communities.
Conflicts in the communities based on non-financial relations often take a form of a pure
power game. The effect of bullying/ridiculing depends on superiority in numbers and tends to
be multiplied with the participants.
Social exclusion occurs when society has no secure measure to protect the groups’ assets
from competitions and leaves no other way to raise productivity, except appropriation. Within
the context of the model, the social planner can reduce occurrence of the minority isolation
through adjusting the group efficiency α, the central tax rT, and the intensity of conflicts rC.
First, she needs to promote the intrinsic benefit of forming a group. Getting together should
be good by itself, not by comparing with others. If possible, the central managing cost rT
should be cut down. Also, conflicts between groups needs to be properly controlled so that a
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part of group assets can be protected from unlimited appropriation. As long as kept at a suit-
able level, competitions and conflicts between groups may give a diversity in group
distribution.
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